Abstract. Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack is a powerful cryptanalytic technique that could be used to retrieve the secret key by exploiting computational errors in the encryption (decryption) procedure. In the present paper, we propose a new DFA attack on SMS4 using a single fault. We show that if a random byte fault is induced into either the second, third, or fourth word register at the input of the 28-th round, the 128-bit master key could be recovered with an exhaustive search of 22.11 bits on average. The proposed attack makes use of the characteristic of the cipher's structure, the speciality of the diffusion layer, and the differential property of the S-box. Furthermore, it can be tailored to any block cipher employing a similar structure and an SPN-style round function as that of SMS4.
Introduction
Fault attacks are where an adversary tries to derive the secret key by accidental or intentional injecting faults in a cryptographic device during its computation of an algorithm. The idea of fault attack was introduced by Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton [3] from Bellcore in 1996. They exploited errors injected during the encryption process and showed that a single faulty encryption could break a CRT-RSA based signature cryptosystem. Later on, such kind of attack was extended by Biham and Shamir to DES-like secret key cryptosystems together with the technique of differential cryptanalysis [5] and referred as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) [4] . Since then, DFA attack has been applied to many other block ciphers, especially on AES (see e.g. [8, 9, 14, 22, 23, 25] ).
When applying fault attacks, it is usually assumed that the adversary has physical access to the tamper-proof device under attack and that he could induce faults by some special equipments. There are lots of methods for fault injection [1, 2, 6, 7, 27] , such as changing the power supply voltage or the frequency of the external clock, varying the environmental temperature, and exposing the circuits of the device to intense lights or lasers. Most of these methods could induce faults at byte level, due to the 8-bit size of a register for most current cryptographic security modules (e.g. smart cards).
Generally speaking, most DFA attacks against block ciphers target the last few rounds, i.e., they exploit computational errors in the last few rounds to extract the secret key. However, in 2003, Hemme showed the possibility of breaking DES with injected faults in the early rounds [15] . And recently, Rivain demonstrates the feasibility of recovering DES key even when faults are injected in the middle rounds [26] . These significant results again confirm that fault attack is really a terrible threat for many real life cryptosystems and it may be not sufficient to protect only the last few rounds of a cipher against fault attacks SMS4 is the underlying block cipher used in the WAPI standard, which is the Chinese national standard for securing Wireless LANs. The details of SMS4 were made public in 2006 by the Chinese government [28] and its English version was translated by Diffie and Ledin [11] at the end of 2008. After its publication, there are many traditional cryptanalytic works evaluating its security including differential attack [32, 33] , linear attack [12] , integral attack [17] , algebraic attack [10, 13, 16] , rectangle attack [21, 29, 32] and impossible differential attack [21, 29] . Besides traditional cryptanalysis, several authors mounted DFA attacks on SMS4 (see e.g. [18, 20, 31] ).
In the present paper, we propose a new DFA attack on SMS4 using a single fault. We generalize the attack described by Takahashi et al. in [30] and consider a more realistic fault model. The main idea is based on the observation of the special characteristic of the cipher's structure and its round function. We show that if a random byte fault is induced into either the second, third or fourth word register at the input of the 28-th round, the 128-bit master key could be derived with an exhaustive search of 22.11 bits on average. Moreover, by using the concept of differential distribution table of the S-box, the efficiency of the proposed attack could be greatly improved, which has been verified by our computer simulations. This paper is organized as follows: a brief description of SMS4 is described in Section 2, some useful properties of the components of SMS4 related to our fault attack are proved in Section 3. Fault model and attack procedure are proposed in Section 4. Section 5 includes some simulation results of our fault attack on SMS4. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Description of SMS4 Algorithm

Notation
The following notations are used throughout this paper.
-F 2 denotes the finite field with elements 0 and 1. -Given a word U ∈ F 32 2 , U ≪ n denotes left rotation of U by n bits.
-#Ω represents the cardinality of the set Ω.
Encryption and Decryption
SMS4 is a 128-bit block cipher with 128-bit key length. It iterates a simple round function 32 times. The encryption and decryption of SMS4 share the same procedure except that the round sub-keys for decryption are used in the reverse order. The overall structure of SMS4 is depicted in Fig.1 and the encryption procedure is described below.
1. The 128-bit plaintext is divided into four 32-bit words (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ). 2. For i = 0 to 31, the words are updated according to the following rule:
where
2 is the round function and RK i is the round-key. 3. The ciphertext is obtained through the following switch transform R,
The round function of SMS4, as depicted in Fig. 2 , is composed of three parts: the round-key addition layer σ, the substitution layer τ and the diffusion layer L, which are described as follows:
-The non-linear transformation τ : F 32 2 → F 32 2 applies four S-boxes in parallel. Let B be the output of τ , and S :
where C is the output of L, B is the input of L as well as the output of τ . Fig. 2 . The round function F of SMS4
Key Schedule
SMS4 only supports 128-bit key and its key schedule is similar to the encryption function. A 128-bit master key is passed to the key schedule to generate 32 words in total for round-keys.
Firstly, the system and fixed parameters are given as follows: the system parameter
4 is defined by F K = (0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc), and the 
, then the generation of the round-key (RK 0 , RK 1 , . . . , RK 31 ) can be described as follows: The procedure of the round-key generation indicates that the master key can be easily retrieved from any four consecutive round-keys.
Some Properties of the Components of SMS4
In this section, several properties of the components of SMS4 are studied, which are related to our fault attack. Their proofs can be found in Appendix A. From Definition 1 and Proposition 1, we can apply differential attack to the S-box of SMS4 in the following model. Differential Attack Model of the S-box. Given an 8 × 8 S-box S(·), let the encryption function be y = S(x⊕k), where x is the input, k is the encryption key, and y is the output. Assume an adversary could get an input pair as (x, x * ), however, he only knows the output difference β = y⊕y * = S(x⊕k)⊕S(x * ⊕k). How can he derive the encryption key k or the key candidates from the triplet (x, x * , β)?
One can refer Appendix B for the detail of the differential attack on an S-box. The key point is using the concept of differential distribution table, by which one triplet could greatly decrease the key candidates from 2 8 to at most 4 (the case for the S-box of SMS4). In fact, the triplet (x, x * , β) corresponds to the following equation
by using differential distribution table of S(·), the solution of the above equation could be expressed as
Thus the candidate set for the right key
Remark 1.
To obtain the key candidates in the differential attack model of the S-box, it is natural that one can try each possible value gk ∈ F 8 2 , then verifies whether or not
This brute-force attack would lead to 2 9 table-lookups. However, if the set IN S (α, β), with all possible (α, β), is stored in a table in advance, a more efficient attack could be applied by using only one table-lookup as described in Appendix B.
Remark 2. Sometimes, when an adversary faces the above differential attack model of the S-box, the two inputs (x, x * ) as well as their output difference β are not necessary the exact values, since the triplet (x, x * , β), or part of it, may be obtained through a key guess on some known or even guessed values, thus such triplet should be treated as a random one. In other words, if (x, x * , β) is obtained through the right key guess, then it always leads to the set x ⊕ IN S (x ⊕ x * , β) containing the right key. However, if (x, x * , β) is obtained through a wrong key guess, it would lead to some other candidate key set, which does not necessarily contain the right key. Even in some special cases, the random triplet (x, x * , β) results in an empty candidate key set which indicates a wrong key guess.
As discussed above, the following situation should be considered: given a random triplet (x, x * , β), what's the property of the solution for the equation
The following proposition answers such a question and it describes the average cardinality of the candidate key set if the equation has any solution.
Proposition 2. Let S(·) be the S-box of SMS4, (x, x
* , β) be a random triplet in F 8 2 , then the following results hold:
is satisfied with probability 0.4942, or in other words, the equation
has any solution, the expectation of the number of solutions is 2.0236.
Next, we present some properties with the linear transformation L in the diffusion layer. We mainly discuss its differential brunch number and inversion expression. 
Differential branch number is a good concept for measuring the diffusion effect of a transformation. By computer program, we know that the differential branch number of L in SMS4 is 5, which ensures that input difference with one non-zero byte will lead to output difference with four non-zero bytes. Moreover, if B(L) = 5, by Def. 2, one can easily proof that B(L −1 ) = 5, where L −1 denotes the inversion of L, whose expression is deduced by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The inversion of the linear transformation L(·) of SMS4 has the following expression:
By the expression of L −1 , the differential attack on the S-box can be easily extended to the round function
, since from the output difference of F , one can easily deduce the output difference of τ , thus he can apply differential attack to each S-box independently.
Proposed DFA Attack on SMS4
In this section, we firstly summarize previous fault attacks on SMS4, then propose our fault attack, including the fault model, main idea, attack procedure and complexity analysis.
Previous DFA Attacks on SMS4
Several DFA attacks on SMS4 are reported in the literature and we summarize them as follows:
The first fault attack on SMS4 was proposed in [31] . By using the byte-oriented model, the 128-bit key could be recovered with 32 faults ideally. The deficiency of such attack is that it can only recover the same round-key when injecting faults in some round. Moreover, at least two faults are needed to deduce one byte of the round-key in their attack model, thus decreasing the efficiency of fault injections.
An improved fault attack on SMS4 was presented in [18] . By injecting random byte faults into some word at the input of the 29-th and 27-th round respectively, the authors claimed that the 128-bit key could be derived efficiently through 2 faults. This improved attack is mainly based on the maximum diffusion property of the linear transform. However, to uniquely deduce the right key, in fact, at least 4 faults are needed in their attack model [19] .
Another kind of fault attack [20] on SMS4 is based on injecting faults into the key schedule of SMS4. After carefully studying the property of the round-key generation, the authors proved that 8 or 32 faults are needed to retrieve the master key according to different fault injection points.
Fault Model and Main Idea
Our proposed fault attack adopts the byte-oriented model, more precisely, it uses the following realistic assumptions:
-The adversary can obtain a pair of correct and faulty ciphertexts both corresponding to the same plaintext and the unknown key. -The adversary knows the area of the fault injection, e.g. he could inject a random byte fault into the first, second, third or fourth word at the input of the 28-th round. -The adversary does not know either the location of the byte in the word or the value of the fault.
All previous fault attacks on SMS4 are based on the differential attack on the S-box as described in Appendix B, thus by injecting sufficient faults, the last four round-keys could be uniquely retrieved. The main idea of our proposed attack, however, is only to deduce the candidates for the last four round-keys, then a brute-force attack is needed to find the right one. The attack procedure is briefly described as follows:
-Randomly choose a plaintext, obtain the correct ciphertext.
-For the same plaintext, inject a random byte fault into either the second, third or fourth word at the input of the 28-th round, and obtain the faulty ciphertext. -According to the cipher's structure, apply the basic attack of the round function, as will be described later, to the 32-nd, 31-st, 30-th, and 29-th round in sequence, obtain the last four round-key candidates. -Apply brute-force attack on these candidates to retrieve the master key.
Attack Procedure
In this subsection, we describe the detailed procedure of the proposed fault attack on SMS4. Without loss of generality, assume a random byte fault occurs at the fourth word of the 28-th round (Faults occur at the second or third word are similar to analyze). As shown in Fig.3 , this new attack applies differential attack to the last 4 rounds of SMS4, and can reduce the key space from 2 128 to 2 22.11 on average, thus an exhaustive search is feasible.
Firstly, we introduce the following basic attack of the round function. For convenience, given a word The following basic attack of the round function could be applied to retrieve the round-key candidate set K and meanwhile reduce the size of possible values for the "other round" key candidate, by which this triplet is obtained.
If for each i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, k i = ∅, then the round-key candidate set must be
If there exists some i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, such that k i = ∅, then this triplet (A, A * , ∆C) indicates no key candidates, i.e., the round-key candidate set K = ∅. Meanwhile, this also implies that the guessed key ("other round" key candidate), by which this triplet (A, A * , ∆C) is obtained, is incorrect.
According to Proposition 2, given a 32-bit random triplet (A, A * , ∆C) for the round function F , the following results hold: -The above attack will output a non-empty round-key candidate set K with probability 0. Thus, the input difference of the 28-th round function is
after passing through the substitution layer,
By the cipher's structure,
According the above analysis, we have the following results:
-∆X 30 ∈ Ψ, thus there are at most 1020 possible values for ∆X 30 .
-∆X 31 = L(∆B 31 ), ∆B 31 ∈ Ψ, thus there are at most 1020 possible values for ∆X 31 .
Now we can describe
Step 2 in the following four consecutive sub-steps.
Step 2.1 Deduce RK 31 . Consider the 32-nd round, the correct as well as the faulty input of the round function F can be calculated as: 30 ) ∈ RK 31 , RK 30 , "decrypt" the ciphertext pair by two rounds and obtain:
Consider the 30-th round, calculate : 30 , RK 29 , "decrypt" the ciphertext pair by three rounds and obtain:
Consider the 29-th round, calculate : Step 3. Retrieve the master key MK. According to the key schedule, we use each possible 4-word round-key candidate after Step 2 to decrypt the right ciphertext Y , then check whether the plaintext is X. Through a brute-force attack, there will be only one 4-word round-key candidate surviving the filtration, in which case, the master key M K can be easily deduced via key schedule (If not the case, try another plaintext/ciphertext pair to verify).
2 Both X31 and X * 31 (thus A31 and A * 31 ) are guessed values and they are not necessary the correct and faulty words unless the guessed round-key gk31 is RK31, the same case also exists for some other intermediate states in the following sub-steps.
Complexity Analysis
As described in Section 4.3, to recover the master key M K, a brute-force attack is needed, thus we have to evaluate the expected value of the size of the round-key candidate set RK 31 
2 , thus ∆B 32 must be one of the following 4 kinds of differences (in total there are 1020 possible values):
Let 
so next, the adversary checks whether or not
-If N S (α 3 , d 3 ) = 0, then differences corresponding to (1)(2)(3) should be discarded, which implies that the number of possible values of ∆B 32 is 255 and that the exact position of the fault is the fourth byte of X 30 . In this situation, the basic attack of the 32-nd round will return (2.0236)
11.051
round-key candidates on overage. 
Since ∆X 34 is known, so is L −1 (∆X 34 
Simulation Results
We implement our proposed DFA attack on SMS4 in C++ code and execute it on a PC with Intel Pentium 1.80 GHz processor. Our simulation experiment is based on 1000 samples and the plaintext as well as the master key in each attack are randomly generated. The distributions of exhaustive search bits after each sub-steps in Step 2 are depicted in Fig.4 . Our experimental result indicates that the average bit space for brute-force search after each sub-steps in step 2 is well agreed with the previous theoretical predications. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new DFA attack on SMS4 using a single fault. We show that if a random byte fault is injected into either the second, third or fourth word at the input of the 28-th round, the 128-bit master key could be retrieved by applying an exhaustive search of 22.11 bits on average. Table 1 lists our work compared with previous fault attacks on SMS4 and Table 2 is the comparison of detailed fault injection points with different attack scenarios. These results indicate that SMS4 can be broken easily using fault based method, thus cryptographic devices supporting SMS4 should be carefully protected.
It should be pointed out that our proposed fault attack can be extended to a more generalized case. Any block cipher that employs a similar structure and an SPN-style round function as that of SMS4 could be suffered from our attack. Assume such a block cipher contains n sub-blocks with n ≥ 2 (n = 2 corresponds to Feistel structure), by injecting a random byte fault into either the second, third, . . . , or n-th word register at the input of the last (n + 1)-th round, the expected number of round-key candidates for the last n rounds could be significantly reduced. Even if the linear transformation of the round function is not optimal (i.e., the differential branch number of the linear transformation does not achieve the maximum), these round-keys could be uniquely determined via a very small quantity of extra fault injections. Sect. 4
* Reference [18] claims that two faults are needed to mount their attack, in fact, at least 4 faults are needed in their attack model [19] . A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
According to [17] , the S-box of SMS4 is affine equivalent to the patched multiplicative inverse over GF ( 2 8 
